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Barbara Herrnstein Smith
Cutting-Edge Equivocation:
Conceptual Moves and Rhetorical Strategies
in Contemporary Anti-Epistemology
We can derive some sense of the way intel-
lectual life is experienced in an era from the
recurrence of certain metaphors used to describe
its conduct—for example, the frequency with
which, in our own time, intellectual projects and
achievements are described in terms of naviga-
tional finesse: the charting of passages between
extremes, the steering of middle courses, the
avoidance of the twin perils of Scylla and Cha-
rybdis. Thus an advertisement for philosopher
Susan Haack’s book, Evidence and Inquiry, fea-
tures a statement by Hilary Putnam praising the
author for ‘‘elaborating and persuasively defend-
ing a position . . . which adroitly steers between
the Scylla of apriorism and the Charybdis of
scientism.’’1 Or again, Image and Logic, by his-
torian of science Peter Galison, is commended
by its reviewer, professor of physics Michael
Riordan, for ‘‘adroitly side-step[ping] one of the
most contentious issues at the heart of current
science wars[:] . . . whether scientific measure-
ments stand on their own as arbiters of reality,
as the positivists insist [o]r, . . . as the relativists
counter, . . . predominantly reflect the biases
of the culture that constructs them.’’ Riordan
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concludes the review by applauding Galison for ‘‘tak[ing] a mighty stand in
the middle of these debates, a richly philosophical voice of moderation with
which both extremes must now reckon.’’2
There is some question, of course, as to whether Riordan’s statement of
the issue in the so-called science wars is altogether evenhanded and, relat-
edly, whether his report of the views of whomever he means by ‘‘the rela-
tivists’’ (he alludes in passing to Thomas Kuhn) is accurate. One might also
raise the question of how such possible bias on Riordan’s part might be
measured and, in the case of disagreements on such matters, what would
stand as their arbiters. Indeed, each of these questions reflects more gen-
eral issues—for example, the limits of observational objectivity and the com-
mensurability of varying conceptions of epistemic value and judgment—
that are also currently contentious but, with significant rhetorical effect, not
acknowledged here as such. In other words, the very terms in which ‘‘mod-
eration’’ is praised promote one side of a conflict (or of several conflicts) over
the other(s) and perpetuate dubious conceptions of the issues involved as
well as the nature of the alternative positions. In these respects, however,
the review is typical of the class of moves and strategies I shall be discuss-
ing here.
An especially self-conscious description of navigational finesse occurs on
the opening pages of a recently published book, On the Origin of Objects,
by philosopher/computational theorist Brian Cantwell Smith, whowrites as
follows:
This book introduces a newmetaphysics—a philosophy of presence—
that aims to steer a path between the Scylla of naive realism and the
Charybdis of pure constructivism. The goal is to develop an integral
account that retains the essential humility underlying each tradition:
a form of epistemic deference to the world that underlies realism, and
a respect for the constitutive human involvement in the world that
underwrites constructivism. . . . the project requires finding . . . a way to
feed our undiminished yearning for foundations and grounding, while
at the same time avoiding the reductionism and ideological fundamen-
talism that have so bedeviled prior foundationalist approaches. . . . the
proposal shows . . . how an irrevocable commitment to pluralism is
compatible with the recognition that not all stories are equally good.3
As this suggests, however, Cantwell Smith’s navigational feat risks be-
coming not so much a steering-between as a steering-in-two-directions-
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at-the-same-time, with the alternate perils—of stasis or shipwreck—that
such a project evokes. Like Riordan’s moderation-praising review of Gali-
son, Cantwell Smith’s launching of his extremity-avoiding voyage involves
a number of question-begging turns. How general, for example, is the set
of people who ‘‘yearn’’—with or without diminishment—for ‘‘foundations
and grounding’’? And is it ‘‘reductionism’’ and ‘‘ideological fundamental-
ism’’ that trouble critics of various foundationalisms, or something more
consequential for Cantwell Smith’s own project, such as fundamental con-
ceptual incoherence?More significant here than the question-begging, how-
ever, is the affirmation of what appear to be contradictory positions. For
if one endorses a constructivist understanding of ‘‘human involvement in
the world’’ as constitutive, then one cannot consistently retain the ‘‘episte-
mic deference’’ to a presumptively autonomous reality that generally defines
realism. It is this sort of elaborated affirmation of mutually incompatible
doctrines or, in the name of middle-road moderation, the simultaneous or
rapidly oscillating avowal and disavowal of both traditional andmore or less
radically revisionist positions that I shall discuss here as ‘‘equivocation.’’ In
regard to a number of currently volatile intellectual issues, it appears to be a
major—perhaps predominant—mode of theoretical discourse in our time.
Some signal features of the mode are illustrated by Cantwell Smith’s
book, which, in response to evidently intractable conceptual problems in
contemporary computational theory, questions the viability of a number of
key assumptions and formulations taken over by computer scientists from
classical metaphysics and philosophy of mind. In the course of his pur-
suit of a ‘‘successor metaphysics,’’ Cantwell Smith outlines a highly origi-
nal and, in some respects, unmistakably constructivist epistemology and
Latourian or Heraclitean ontology.4 Anxieties about the dangers or absur-
dities lurking in such positions, however (‘‘I’m-OK-you’re-OK-pluralism,’’
solipsistic idealism, and so forth), along with axiomatic commitments to
some dubiously privileged intuitions (the conviction of most computer
scientists, for example, that human cognition and the operations of arti-
factual computers reflect the same underlying mechanisms) lead him re-
currently back to only superficially reformed versions of the ideas and
assumptions he otherwise questions and seeks to escape. Thus while he
stresses that objects and their properties are neither fixed nor prior but
emerge from dynamic, context-dependent interactions between actively
‘‘registering’’ subjects and fluid ‘‘object-regions,’’ he also insists that the re-
lationship between subject and object is ‘‘fundamentally asymmetrical’’:
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‘‘When subject and object part company, the object wins. . . . Subject really
is less; world, more—as much in terms of potency and worth as in terms
of content or substance.’’5 Or again, he observes that ‘‘although there is
something right about speaking of individual subjects as the entities or
agents that register, this is not to deny that in all likelihood it will be
whole cultures, language communities, communities of practice, or collec-
tivities of people-and-instruments-and-organizations-and-documents-and-
tools-and-other-essential-but-expensive-entities that are the full sustaining
locus of this intentional achievement’’6—which balances a residual Carte-
sianism against a sophisticated but hedged constructivism, on the toes, so
to speak, of a paradoxically individualistic but collectivist intentionalism.
Cantwell Smith cites, as elucidating his own project, a passage from
Donna Haraway’s influential essay ‘‘Situated Knowledges: The Science
Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspectives’’ that reads
as follows: ‘‘So, I thinkmy problem and ‘our’ problem is how to have simulta-
neously an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims
and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own ‘semi-
otic technologies’ for making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment
to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world, one that can be partially shared and
friendly to earth-wide projects of finite freedom, adequate material abun-
dance,modestmeaning in suffering, and limited happiness.’’7TheHaraway
passage will concern us a bit later when it is cited by feminist philosopher
Sandra Harding in response to a different set of intellectual pressures. For
the moment, however, we might note that it evidently figures for a number
of its readers both as a compelling formulation of a key problem of contem-
porary thought and as a model for its solution.
At the least, these recurrent figures of navigational maneuvering—avoid-
ing extremes, finding a middle course between twin perils, holding on to
both sides, keeping everything onboard—suggest that, for many scholars,
contemporary intellectual life is a stressful venture, fraughtwith danger and
haunted by anxieties about the seductiveness, naïveté, or fatality of certain
moves, choices, or rejections. Part of my interest here is what hasmade that
the case in contemporary epistemology (or anti-epistemology) and how vari-
ous responses to that situation illuminate the dynamics of intellectual life,
both currently and more generally.
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A word should be said first about the perilous seas within which all this
anxious steering is occurring. Clearly there are significant contemporary
challenges to classical epistemology andmainstream philosophy of science:
new ways of answering classic questions concerning the formation and vali-
dation (or is it contingent stabilization?) of belief, new questions about the
nature and operations of scientific knowledge, and new assessments of the
role of academic philosophy both in posing such questions and in grounding
or adjudicating their answers. These challenges are by no means recent in
origin. Some have been part of the philosophical tradition since Protagoras;
others can be traced without difficulty to the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche,
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger,William James, and John Dewey;
yet others have emerged during the course of the twentieth century from
research and analysis in the scientific disciplines themselves, for example,
in quantum theory and, more recently, in developmental biology and cogni-
tive science.Work in all these fields has indicated the need to review and, to
somedegree, revise traditional ideas and conventionalwisdom—formal and
informal—about knowledge, science, and cognitive processes. At the same
time theorists and scholars in various relatively new fields, including femi-
nist epistemology and constructivist history and sociology of science, have
pressed these challenges with especially aggressive energy and in quarters
quite close to home—that is, in academic philosophy itself.8
Responses to these developments among philosophers, scientists, and
scholars or theorists in related fields vary, as might be expected, in rela-
tion to individual intellectual history, professional identity and status, cog-
nitive taste and temperament, and other commitments and agendas (for ex-
ample, religious or political) and range from eager embrace and declarations
of close alliance to excoriation and frenzies of refutation.9 It is in this con-
text that we must understand the general sense of peril and anxiety I have
indicated. I turn now to a closer look at some specific expressions of it.
The types of equivocating moves and strategies to be discussed here some-
times announce themselves as a middle way between what are described as
‘‘extremes.’’ It is not uncommon, of course, for diverging intellectual posi-
tions to become polarized and certainly not impossible for a proposed via
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media to offer, and operate as, a genuinely valuable alternative to two mani-
festly strained sides. In the cases that concernme here, however, the alleged
extremes are typically somewhat gerrymandered, one of thembeing, in fact,
the currently orthodox doctrine itself, but in an especially hoary version that,
as such, has few if any contemporary advocates (for example, ‘‘pure aprio-
rism,’’ ‘‘naive realism,’’ or ‘‘dogmatic positivism’’) while the other alleged ex-
treme is the currently most powerful challenger but characterized in terms
that make it appear dismissable out of hand (for example, ‘‘trendy scien-
tism,’’ ‘‘corrosive hyperrelativism,’’ and so forth). This leaves, to occupy the
space of the purportedly moderate middle way, either the orthodox doctrine
once more, though described this time in duly reasonable-sounding or up-
dated terms (‘‘moderate realism,’’ ‘‘historically informed positivism,’’ and so
forth), along with, perhaps, an appliqué of selected but denatured elements
of the contemporary alternative or, as in several of the examples considered
below, a conceptually unstable amalgamation of crucial but also mutually
contradictory elements of each.10
Conceptual instability is often a key problem here. Innovative theoreti-
cal proposals, including radically innovative ones, inevitably preserve some
elements of traditional thought, typically reworking or redefining them in
conjunction with significantly novel elements or extending them, thus con-
joined, into significantly new domains of application. Indeed, though not
usually motivated by anxious extremity avoidance, such fertile combina-
tions of old and new are probably the most common forms of conceptual
innovation and creative transformation in any field. A major problem with
the fundamentally equivocating hybrids described above, however, com-
posed as they are of attenuated and/or patched-together, mutually canceling
concepts, is that they can do little theoretical work and, indeed, commonly
cannot be extended beyond the pages on which they are framed, even by
their admirers. (It is not clear, for example, that Haraway’s elaboration in
‘‘Situated Knowledges’’ of the idea and project framed in themuch cited pas-
sage quoted above—that is, that her and our problem is how to have, simul-
taneously, a large number of evidently desirable or necessary-seeming but
possibly incompatible things—amounts to much more than a series of re-
iterated affirmations of that idea and project themselves.) Conversely, what
gives many of the ‘‘extreme’’ proposals their conceptual power is, among
other things, precisely their extremity—that is, the unhedged explicitness
of their questioning or rejection of various traditional ideas and the consis-
Cutting-Edge Equivocation 193
tency of the alternative ideas they develop.Contrary towhat the term extreme
may suggest, these intellectual virtues are the product not of uncontrolled
excess or exhibitionist derring-do but, rather, of an effort at clear and pre-
cise formulation and a rigorousworking-through of theoretical and practical
implications—at least where such characteristics are in fact displayed. The
intellectual virtues of some challenges to orthodoxy, ‘‘extreme’’ and other-
wise, may, of course, be quite meager.
Some specific examples will be useful here. Within the past few years a
number of works have appeared offering either to mediate between or to
synthesize traditional philosophy of mind and such relatively new fields as
artificial intelligence, cognitive science, constructivist epistemology, and/or
dynamical systems theory. Such projects confront a number of rhetorical
difficulties: not only the familiar problems involved inmaking novel, techni-
cally complex ideas comprehensible to nonspecialists but also, more signifi-
cantly here, the difficulties that the authors of such worksmay encounter in
articulating their own positions with regard to ideas currently orthodox or
heretical in their own fields and, relatedly, the task, often cognitively stress-
ful as well as professionally delicate, of negotiating their own intellectual
allegiances or even identitieswith regard to their homedisciplines.One sign
of these difficulties is the emphasis in such works, often in tandemwith the
announcement of radical transformations, fundamentally new paradigms,
and significant alternatives to traditional thought,11 on the need to retain cer-
tain egregiously traditional ideas, an emphasis that becomes quite problem-
atic when it is the viability or necessity of just those ideas that is disputedmost
strenuously by the most controversial but arguably fertile developments in
the relevant new fields.
When we focus on the stated reasons for preserving this or that allegedly
indispensable element of traditional thought, we begin to see the sorts of
pressures that lead to these cognitive stresses and rhetorical evasions. One
such reason is that the idea or method in question is, as it may be said,
so intuitively compelling or well established in the field that it cannot and
should not be abandoned.Thus, in his recentmediating-synthesizing work,
Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again, philosopher/
cognitive theorist Andy Clark, explaining the need to retain traditional ideas
of internal representation, computation, and ‘‘stored programs’’ in the brain
despite the (‘‘radical’’) effort by other theorists to model the dynamics of
cognition without appeal to such ideas, argues that ‘‘it would be folly to
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simply jettison the hard-won bedrock of cognitive scientific understanding
that involves [such] ideas.’’12 This seems to say, however, only that those
ideas are very orthodox indeed. Clark’s rather amusingly (and multiply)
mixed metaphor, that is, the supposed folly of jettisoning (hard-won) bed-
rock, invites a pertinent query: Would it be better, navigationally speak-
ing, to keep bedrock onboard or, of course, even to begin a voyage with
such cargo?13
Significantly, Clark argues in a more recent essay for a policy of ‘‘accom-
modation not elimination’’ in negotiating the differences between the cur-
rently prevailing computational/representational model of cognition and
the alternative dynamical/ecological model proposed by other theorists.14
Metaphors of negotiation or accommodation generally sound more reason-
able in responses to intellectual rivals than those of outright warfare or total
elimination and, where otherwise appropriate, are certainly preferable to
denunciation, demonization, and other rhetorical strong-arm tactics. As in
macropolitics, however, so also in the micropolitics of intellectual struggle:
a refusal to acknowledge the strength of a challenger or the extent and pos-
sibly radical nature of the difference between an opponent’s views and one’s
own is likely to be ultimately debilitating. The question in regard to Clark’s
efforts here (and comparable attempts at theoretical synthesis elsewhere) is
whether the two now hopefully reconciled theories are, in fact, ultimately
compatible and, specifically here, whether just piggybacking elements of
the dynamical/ecological model of cognition onto the otherwise unmodi-
fied representationalist/computational model solves the crucial conceptual
problems in the latter that led to its rejection—and to the related develop-
ment of various alternative accounts—in the first place.15
Another—perhaps the major—reason commonly offered for retaining a
traditional idea is that its rejection would amount to an embrace of what is
seen as the only and a clearly foolish (for example, solipsistic or self-refuting)
or dangerous (for example, leading to Auschwitz or endorsing clitoridec-
tomy) alternative.Thus explainingwhy, versus ‘‘pure constructivism,’’ a real-
ist conception of ‘‘a world out there’’ must be retained in any adequatemeta-
physics, Cantwell Smith observes, ‘‘There is more to the world than us . . . :
more than our imaginations, more than our experience, more than our
thoughts and dreams.’’16 Contrary, however, to the implications of Cantwell
Smith’s argument for the retention, the idea that the world is nothingmore
than our imaginations, thoughts, dreams, or in any idiomatic sense, experi-
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ence is by no means the only alternative to realism, as one discovers if one
examines various nonrealist epistemologies in their actual, as distinct from
distorted or sloganized, articulations—for example, in Ludwik Fleck’s clas-
sic (and arguably ‘‘pure [proto-]constructivist’’) work, Genesis and Develop-
ment of a Scientific Fact.17
The configuration of mutually sustaining but individually dubious as-
sumptions, anxieties, and charges just indicated is a recurrent feature of
contemporary theoretical controversy and, as such, interesting along anum-
ber of lines. The point I would stress here is that, as in the example just
examined, the scandalizing alternatives to orthodox thought commonly
said to require the reaffirmation of traditional ideas are themselves often
empty positions, maintained as positions by nobody but functioning cru-
cially within the intellectual tradition as self-haunting, self-policing, self-
perpetuating others, continuously regenerating, by sheer contradistinction,
the substance of the tradition’s self-defining orthodoxies. Thus cognitive
psychology is kept in line by a straw-man behaviorism, theoretical biology
polices itself in opposition to a shadowy Lamarckism,18 and orthodox epis-
temology is haunted (and kept orthodox) by the phantom heresy of ‘‘rela-
tivism.’’
Ghostly or empty though these alternatives may be, their invocation is
nonetheless powerful. To say that some set of views is orthodox is to say,
among other things, that it is institutionally well established and thus part
of the conventional training and ongoing discursive and conceptual opera-
tions of some field or discipline. For many people rigorously trained in the
field in question and especially for those currently operating in it profession-
ally, it may be very difficult to think otherwise and, in a way, unnecessary to
do so, at least as long as they remain within the institutional orbits of that
orthodoxy. For others in that field, perhaps no less rigorously trained but
operating at its margins (interacting, perhaps, with scholars, scientists, or
theorists in other disciplines orworking in relatively peripheral areas), some
elements of the constitutive heresy may appear, especially in contempo-
rary articulations, intellectually compelling and appropriable, but the pos-
sibility of affirming or incorporating them explicitly may be inhibited by
considerable anxiety, including a well-enough instructed fear of social and
professional punishment—for example, scorn or ostracism—at the hands
of academic associates or disciplinary colleagues. We shall see some vivid
examples of such dynamics below.
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In addition to equivocation in a variety of technical and looser senses, sev-
eral other moves and strategies are of related interest here, including what
I call ritual exorcism or blackening the devil—that is, the vigorous dissocia-
tion of one’s own manifestly (explicitly acknowledged or indeed stressed)
non- or antiorthodox ideas fromanofficially heretical position, accompanied
by the voluble bad-mouthing of the position thus named. Thus the pragma-
tist (and arguably relativistic) philosopher Richard Rorty strenuously rejects
what he calls relativism; the constructivist (and arguably postmodernist)
theorist of science Bruno Latour derides what he calls postmodernism; and
the explicitly post-Cartesian (and inmany respects behaviorist) neuroscien-
tist Antonio Damasio pauses to malign behaviorism.19 Such otherwise gra-
tuitous disavowals reflect many of the same institutional dynamics as does
equivocation, with comparable short-run rhetorical advantages but long-
run intellectual costs. For insofar as it reinforces the idea that the position
thus disparaged (for example, behaviorism) is, in fact, monolithic and either
plainly foolish or plainly sinister as commonly believed or that the label thus
strenuously rejected (for example, ‘‘relativism’’ or ‘‘postmodernism’’) names
a position that is actually maintained with the foolish claims and dangerous
entailments commonly attributed to it, ritual exorcism strengthens a major
line of justification for the continued dominance of the intellectual ortho-
doxy that is otherwise being explicitly challenged. Such devil-blackenings
are also more generally intellectually damaging insofar as they endorse the
prejudices and foster the anxieties of less knowledgeable colleagues, stu-
dents, or members of the public and thus—this being the way canonical
distortions perpetuate themselves—effectively deprive new generations of
scholars and theorists of potentially useful intellectual resources.These and
other points touched onhere can be illustratedwith another set of examples,
drawn this time from feminist epistemology or, possibly, anti-epistemology.
In a recent essay explaining the idea of ‘‘standpoint epistemology’’ and
promoting her own related position of ‘‘strong objectivism,’’ feminist phi-
losopher of science Sandra Harding argues that one may maintain that ‘‘all
knowledge is socially situated versus the conventional idea that beliefs count
as knowledge only when they break free [of ] . . . local, historical interests,
values, and agendas’’ but still not ‘‘slide’’ into ‘‘relativism.’’ For, she con-
tinues, citing the passage by Haraway quoted above, ‘‘it turns out to be pos-
sible to have ‘simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for
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all knowledge claims and knowing subjects . . . and a no-nonsense commit-
ment to faithful accounts of a ‘‘real’’ world.’ ’’20
It is not insignificant that the word real appears in this passage in quota-
tion marks. Feminist epistemologists, caught between the particular politi-
cal commitments that motivate and define their project as feminist and the
largely universalist assumptions and aspirations that prevail in academic
philosophy, are driven repeatedly to equivocating moves and gestures. Spe-
cifically, arguments and formulations that explicitly challenge the defining
claims, terms, and missions of objectivist/rationalist/realist epistemology
and normative/universalist philosophy of science also pointedly affirm vari-
ous crucial elements of each. Thus in the Harding-Haraway passage just
quoted, while the idea of the ‘‘situated’’ nature of knowledge is framed as
‘‘versus’’ the conventional idea of genuine knowledge as transcendent, the
assurance of a ‘‘no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’
world’’ affirms an epistemologically orthodox realism versus a threatening
slide into heterodox relativism and, in the same breath, signals a skepticism
toward that same orthodoxy via quotation marks on the crucial term real.
If feminist (anti-)epistemologists such as Harding and Haraway feel
called on repeatedly to affirm the reality of Reality and the possibility of
faithful accounts of it, it is largely because of the common conviction and
frequent charge by academic philosophers (and those whom they have
instructed) that to maintain the historical, social, or other contingency
of all knowledge claims is ipso facto to deny the possibility of—in their
idiomatic/informal as well as technical/formal senses—true, accurate, or
objective reports. Not all the pressure for such affirmations of intellec-
tual orthodoxy comes, however, from the philosophical side of the femi-
nist/epistemologist double bind. Related political pressures originate in
familiarMarxist-feminist distinctions, such as that between genuine under-
standing and mere ideology or ‘‘false consciousness,’’ and also in such spe-
cifically feminist projects as the ‘‘legitimation’’ (as it is termed) of women’s
disputed accounts of their own experiences—for example, of rape. It is
widely believed that the political success of such projects depends on the
rhetorical/justificatory force of such distinctions, and that the latter depend
in turn on the possibility of invoking a world of transcendently objective
facts or universally valid truth claims—facts and claims, that is, that are em-
phatically not (‘‘merely’’) socially (or otherwise) ‘‘situated.’’ Such convictions
double (and are, of course, historically derivable from) those of amore tradi-
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tional realist/rationalist epistemology and, accordingly, double the anxieties
that attend the more general project of feminist epistemology.
The gestures elicited by such anxieties are sometimes instructively self-
reflexive, as in the essay by feminist philosopher Lorraine Code titled
‘‘Taking Subjectivity into Account.’’ In the body of her essay Code argues
that the paradigmatic form of knowledge in epistemology and related dis-
courses, such as judicial theory, should not be our presumptively but du-
biously objective knowledge of objects but, rather, our manifestly subjective
knowledge of other people, specifically the people with whom we have per-
sonal relationships. It is not an easy argument to make, and Code’s suc-
cess in making it is limited. My primary concern here, however, is the
question she raises toward the end of her essay, where she asks whether
her argument stressing the significance of a subjectivist epistemology for
feminism means that ‘‘feminist epistemologists must, after all, ‘come out’
as relativists.’’21 Her answer to that question is ‘‘a qualified yes,’’ but it is
followed by a significant yet: ‘‘Yet the relativism that my argument gen-
erates is sufficiently nuanced and sophisticated to escape the scorn—and
the anxiety—that ‘relativism, after all’ usually occasions.’’ Indeed, the rela-
tivism that Code generates in the succeeding pages of her essay is so thor-
oughly nuanced and sophisticated—or, one could say, haunted, hedged, and
attenuated (‘‘refus[ing] to occupy the negative side of the traditional abso-
lutism/relativism dichotomy[,] . . . at once realist, rational and sufficiently
objective,’’ and so forth)—that one could very well mistake that qualified yes
for an unqualified no.
The terms of Code’s self-characterization raise some immediate ques-
tions. First, one may wonder if she believes that the relativism commonly
scorned byher disciplinary colleagues and others—the ideas, presumably, of
heterodox theorists and philosophers such as Nietzsche, Kuhn, Paul Feyer-
abend, Nelson Goodman, and Rorty—is not nuanced or sophisticated. And,
if it is not from the work of figures such as these, then one may ask from
what crude, rude, or naive relativism Code is here distancing herself. Such
questions arise not only because Code names no names but also because,
as pointed out above, there is reason to think that the foolish or danger-
ous ideas commonly scorned as ‘‘relativism’’—the idea, for example, that all
beliefs or accounts are equally valid (under all conditions, from all perspec-
tives)22 or that the world can be constructed just as we choose—constitute
a phantom heresy without visible, palpable, or citable adherents. The phan-
tom appears to be continuously generated by the seesaw logic of orthodox
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epistemology itself: if not classic realism, then classic idealism; if not abso-
lute objectivism, then absolute subjectivism; if not one uniquely valid interpre-
tation/judgment/theory, then all equally valid interpretations/judgments/
theories; and so forth. It may be given added apparent substance, however,
by such heavy rhetorical scaffolding as glib conflation, crude decontextual-
ization, dubious imputation, tendentious paraphrase, and slapdash intellec-
tual history.23
To the extent that this is the case—that is, that the menace-heresy of
relativism is substantively empty—it appears that, rather than spending so
much time and energy anticipating and attempting to deflect such charges,
Code and other feminist (anti-)epistemologists might do better exposing
their hollowness, criticizing in earnest the entire conceptual systems that
continuously generate and sustain them, and exploring the possible value,
for feminism and social theory more generally, of the specific, elaborated
ideas of the thinkers whose views are commonly so charged and dismissed.
Indeed, in view of the quantities of intellectual labor that, in the absence
of such direct challenges to demonology, must now go into protecting their
own efforts from such out-of-hand dismissals, it would seem to be themore
intellectually efficient as well as responsible way to go.
As it stands, the anxiety to avert charges of relativism is not only a con-
siderable distraction from other potentially more productive intellectual
activities but leads, often enough, to strained and tangled formulations.
Code acknowledges as much in her own case in the final paragraph of
her essay. ‘‘There are,’’ she writes, ‘‘many tensions within the strands my
skeptical-relativist recommendations try to weave together,’’ tensions to be
expected, she observes, ‘‘at this critical juncture in the articulation of eman-
cipatory epistemological projects.’’24 The question, however, here and more
generally, is whether both the emancipatory and the epistemological com-
mitments of such projects, to the extent that either of them is conceived
along conventional political or conventional philosophical lines, might not
be holding their more radical critical and creative energies hostage.
I return to that question below but wish, first, to pursue further the terms
of Code’s description of the scorn thatmotivates feminist anxiety about rela-
tivism. She writes:
The opponents of relativism have been so hostile, so thoroughly scorn-
ful in their dismissals, that it is no wonder that feminists, well aware
of the folk-historical identification of women with the forces of unrea-
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son, should resist the very thought that the logic of feminist emancipa-
tory analyses points in that direction. . . . The intransigence of material
circumstances constantly reminds them that their world-making pos-
sibilities are neither unconstrained nor infinite. . . . In fact, many femi-
nists are vehement in their resistance to relativism precisely because
they suspect—not without reason—that only the supremely powerful
and privileged . . . could believe that they canmake up the world as they
will and practice that supreme tolerance in whose terms all possible
constructions of reality are equally worthy.25
Code goes on to question the accuracy of the latter suspicion but only to sug-
gest—equally tenuously, I think—that ‘‘only the supremely powerful and
privileged’’ could believe there was but one truth.
Many questions could be raised about this argument (e.g., are feminists,
as Code implies, more familiar with ‘‘the intransigence of material circum-
stances’’ than other people who question traditional objectivist thought, and
do the latter really need reminding ‘‘that their world-making possibilities
are neither unconstrained nor infinite’’?), but two points require emphasis
here. First, I say equally tenuously because both views of the beliefs of ‘‘the
supremely powerful and privileged,’’ those Code attributes to many femi-
nists and her own, reflect the logically and empirically dubious assumption
that people’s epistemologies line up squarely with their social and/or eco-
nomic situations, which reflects in turn the comparably dubious assump-
tion that the inherent political value of a theoretical position can be deter-
mined by the political positions of the particular people who happen, at a
given time, tomaintain it.The converse view, I would stress, is not that there
is no relation between people’s theoretical preferences and their social or
economic situations, or between the political value of a theoretical position
and the politics of those who propose and/or promote it, but rather, that
both relations are highlymediated by other variable conditions.Thesewould
include other intellectual and/or political commitments and other aspects
of the social situations of the people in question as well as significant fea-
tures of the particular intellectual and institutional contexts in which the
theoretical preferences in question are maintained or played out. Certainly
no generalized ideology-critique or accurate all-time prediction of political
uptake could have been produced in the past for such theoretical prefer-
ences as polytheism versusmonotheism, logical positivism versusHegelian
idealism, or Darwinism versus biblical creationism. Nor, I think, can any
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be usefully produced for such current theoretical preferences as epistemic
pluralism versus epistemicmonism or constructivist science studies versus
realist/rationalist philosophy of science.
The second point concerns the idea, which Code endorses (‘‘many femi-
nists . . . suspect—not without reason’’), that there exists a set of people who
do, in fact, ‘‘believe that they canmake up the world as they will and practice
that supreme tolerance in whose terms all possible constructions of reality
are equally worthy.’’ The idea is worth pausing over since it has, as we shall
see, considerable circulation among feminist epistemologists and other con-
temporary philosophers but appears quite questionably derived. The likely
derivation here as elsewhere is a misunderstanding of the frequently men-
tioned but evidently rarely read ‘‘symmetry postulate’’ of Edinburgh-based
(‘‘Strong Programme’’) sociology of science. The postulate, which has noth-
ing to dowith tolerance in any of the usual senses of the term,maintains not
that all constructions of reality are equally worthy but, rather, that the credi-
bility of all constructions of reality, including those now commonly accepted
as true or reasonable, should be regarded as equallyneedful of explanation and
as explicable, in principle, by the same general types of causes.26 A key meth-
odological point of departure—not epistemic judgment—in contemporary
science studies, the symmetry postulate is routinely transformed into a fatu-
ous egalitarianism (everything is equally true, good, worthy, valid, and so
forth) by those who encounter it primarily through hearsay or interpret its
implications via the seesaw logic described above.The anxiety-eliciting con-
figuration to which Code and other feminists are responding, however, is
not merely a common and especially obdurate set of intellectual misunder-
standings but a common though dubious set of political assumptions and
assessments as well.
The symmetry postulate, correctly stated and appropriately interpreted,
implies, among other things, that no belief or knowledge claim can be pre-
sumed intrinsically credible (or ‘‘valid’’). This is an idea, one might think,
that would appear highly serviceable to feminists as well as to members
of other groups whose political or social subordination is underwritten by
what are claimed to be, by those in dominant positions, self-evident facts.
As it happens, a number of politically concerned scholars working in sci-
ence studies have found the idea serviceable and put it to use accordingly
in their research and analyses.27 But there’s a catch. For by the same token,
the symmetry postulate creates difficulties for feminists (and others) who
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want to maintain that certain beliefs or knowledge claims are intrinsically
credible: for example, the truth claims made by women about what they
experience as rape or, as in some versions of standpoint epistemology, the
knowledge claimsmade from the perspective of members of one or another
marginalized group.28 What Code and others refer to as supreme tolerance,
then, might be better described as supremely evenhanded intolerance—that
is, a principled rejection of all claims to generic epistemic privilege, not only
the conventionally privileged knowledge claims of scientists as such but also
claims made for the intrinsically privileged knowledge of women as such.
For some feminists, that’s all they need to know about the symmetry postu-
late to know that it’s bad news politically. There are, however, good reasons
for them to look more closely at the political implications of the postulate
and also at those of constructivist accounts of knowledge more generally.
For although such ideas and accountsmay unsettle certain standard rhetori-
cal practices of the political left (as well as the political and intellectual right),
they also suggest a broad range of alternative rhetorical practices and forms
of political activity—including activity aimed at radical social and economic
change—that are, at the same time, intellectually self-consistent, ethically
responsible, and pragmatically effective.29
Though beset by institutional vulnerabilities and conceptually haunted
and hobbled along the lines suggested here, the project of feminist epis-
temology is not, I think, inherently doomed. A number of recent efforts
are especially encouraging, among them an essay by Linda Martin Alcoff
titled ‘‘Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?’’ Arguing against the
idea that the missions and practices of philosophy and those of feminism
are incompatible, but also against shaky efforts by other feminists to stake
their political claims on standard philosophical grounds, Alcoff calls for an
alternative, explicitly critical, relation between feminism and philosophy,
including epistemology: ‘‘If we [feminists] . . . acknowledge that forms of
rationality . . . are embedded within history, we must also acknowledge that
reasoned argument is only a part of what is contained in our or any other
philosophical writings. . . . the better alternative is to reconfigure the rela-
tionship between . . . reason and its others, to acknowledge the instability of
these categories and the permeability of their borders, and to develop a re-
constructed notion of reason . . . as including multiple forms and operating
on many levels.’’30
Such a project, Alcoff observes, would be ‘‘incorrectly interpreted as a re-
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duction of reason to unreason. . . . Rationality does not need the Manichean
epistemic ontology of an absolute truth-mastery over an abject unreason.
It needs distinctions, between true and false, and more and less rational,
but these can be formulated differently through developing an account of
the situatedness of truth and reason.’’31 These (despite some arguably gratu-
itous retentions) are, I would agree, among the more promising lines to be
pursued: distinctions acknowledged but formulated differently; accounts
developed, but by appropriating and extending, not blunting, the intellectu-
ally radical force of other contemporary critiques and alternatives, including
the idea—crucial to but crucially hedged by Harding and Haraway—of the
‘‘situatedness’’ (that is, historical and contextual contingency and specificity)
of what are, at any time, called truth, reason, facts, or knowledge.
Where radically new ideas and strong critiques that are seen as intellec-
tually compelling are also seen as conflicting with accepted political theory
and practice, the proper response, I think, is not to renounce those ideas,
muffle those critiques, or strive, in order to safeguard politics-as-usual, to
drastically confine their reach. On the contrary, the most intellectually re-
sponsible response and the one most likely to be, in the long run, politi-
cally desirable is, I think, to pursue the implications of those ideas and cri-
tiques as rigorously and extensively as possible, including into the domains
of politics—both theory and practice—themselves. The risk, of course, is
that the resulting political theory and practicemay look quite different from
their as-usual versions. They may, for example, evoke or involve new sets of
considerations, different configurations of interests, and different forms of
practice for achieving whatever goals are seen as significant. (It is also likely
that articulations and understandings of those otherwise compelling new
ideas and critiques will themselves be transformed, perhaps radically so, in
the process.) Such risks for habitual ways of thinking and practicing poli-
tics, including radical politics, could also be seen, however, as offering the
possibility of substantial—perhaps revolutionary—benefits.
As mentioned above, Code’s understandings of the political implications of
constructivist and/or symmetricalizing sociology of science are by nomeans
unique. Virtually the same set of claims, charges, and rhetorical gestures
can be found not only in the writing of other feminist epistemologists but
also in that of other contemporary philosophers of science, where, however,
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they commonly serve other or additional agendas. Thus in a recent book
provocatively titled The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the
Disunity of Science, philosopher of science John Dupré, declaring intellec-
tual kinship withWittgenstein and Feyerabend and deriving authority from
their counterestablishment epistemologies, nevertheless assails ‘‘the soci-
ology of knowledge movement’’ as follows:
By asserting that all scientific belief should be explained in terms of
the goals, interests, and prejudices of the scientist, and denying any
role whatsoever for the recalcitrance of nature, it leaves no space for the
criticism of specific scientific beliefs on the ground that they do reflect
such prejudices rather than being plausibly grounded in fact. The un-
congeniality of the sociology of science program to thinkers genuinely
concerned with political influences on scientific belief is nicely stated
by the feminist philosopher of science AlisonWylie . . . : ‘‘Only themost
powerful, themost successful in achieving control over theworld, could
imagine that the world can be constructed as they choose.’’32
This passage is of interest not only because it recalls the similarly worded
one by Code examined above (and repeats comparable misrepresentations
of the claims of contemporary sociology of science, which does not char-
acteristically ‘‘[assert] that all scientific belief should be explained in terms
of the goals, interests, and prejudices of the scientist’’) but also because it
exemplifies a more general strategy that has become fairly common in cur-
rent academic controversy: the validation of intellectual traditionalism by
appeals to or gestures of solidarity with political radicalism.33 Notable in
that connection is Dupré’s curious allusion to ‘‘the uncongeniality of the
sociology of science program to thinkers genuinely concerned with politi-
cal influences on scientific belief ’’—curious because the work of that pro-
gram’s most eminent practitioners, for example, David Bloor, Barry Barnes,
AndrewPickering, or StevenWoolgar, would certainly seem to be extensively
concernedwith ‘‘political influences on scientific belief.’’ (Indeed, in the out-
raged view of various recent detractors, it is quite menacingly concerned
with nothing else.)34 Has Dupré failed to notice that concern? Or is he sug-
gesting that the sociologists are just faking it (not ‘‘genuinely concerned’’)?
Or is it not, rather, that the particular ways they trace and articulate the com-
plex, dynamic relationships among individual, social, and political interests,
institutional configurations, technical practices, and scientific statements
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are hard to square with the claim of established philosophy of science to
distinguish, on strictly rational or logical grounds, between the truly epi-
stemic and the merely social or political? If so, then the issue here is not
the political authenticity of the sociology of science but, rather, the ability of
traditional philosophy of science to engage the intellectual challenges and
achievements of an alternative, rival project.35
A word more may be added on the quoted passage—which should go
without saying but evidently does not. Contrary to the charge that Dupré
lodges here and finds ‘‘nicely stated’’ by feminist Wylie, sociologists of
knowledge do not characteristically imagine that the world can be con-
structed as they or anyone else wishes. For, of course, what they characteris-
tically do as sociologists of science is investigate how beliefs about the world
are socially shaped, constrained, and stabilized. Nor do they claim or pro-
ceed as if they believed that all things are infinitely malleable by the human
mind. The idea that the ‘‘constructed’’ in constructivism means made-up-
in-your-individual-head-however-you-want-it-to-be is a rather vulgar error,
to be expected, perhaps, from journalists or academics in remote disci-
plines but not, generally, in the work of presumably knowledgeable philoso-
phers of science. As for the idea—floated byWylie, endorsed by Dupré, and
echoed in Code—that sociologists of knowledge can think the way they do
only because they (versus women? versus feminists? versus realist philoso-
phers?) are ‘‘supremely powerful and privileged,’’ ‘‘the most powerful, the
most successful in achieving control over the world’’: well, when one recalls
the perennially underfunded, administratively threatened, and institution-
ally precarious situations of various associate or even full professors of soci-
ology of science at places such as Urbana, Illinois, or Loughborough, En-
gland, it appears pretty ludicrous. Of course as Western, male (where they
are) academics, such sociologists may be relatively powerful and privileged.
But ‘‘supremely powerful and privileged,’’ ‘‘the most successful in achieving
control over the world,’’ and so forth? What is the point of such language?
I turn now to some final observations. Equivocation, rightward-veering
middle-way steering, and ritual exorcismare conceptual/rhetorical practices
that evade cognitive stress and professional peril but entail their own risks
and costs. My main interest in examining such practices here has been to
delineate the microdynamics of certain features of contemporary intellec-
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tual life. I have also been concerned, however, with the broader implications
of those practices, that is, with their communal and institutional as well as
individual risks and costs. I shall, in the remarks that follow, be further con-
cerned with both levels of accounting.
Under conditions of acute and widespread conceptual clash within some
more or less established institutional-intellectual domain, there will always
be those—scholars, scientists, theorists, and so forth—whose conviction of
the adequacy of traditional views remains unshaken and who, accordingly,
will continue to reaffirm the traditional positions as such, staunchly rehears-
ing the classic justifications and refutations, unruffled by what colleagues
experience as the logical bite of current challenges, unimpressed by what
others see as the revolutionary implications of those challenges for ongoing
practices in the field. I discuss the psychological dynamics of such reaffirma-
tions elsewhere under the term cognitive self-stabilization and point out there
the forms of logical and conceptual strain that often attend them: in brief,
a tendency toward continuous—though often artful and rhetorically as well
as cognitively effective—circularity.36 This is not to suggest, however, that a
resistance to novelty and adherence to traditional but now questioned ideas
reflect an intellectual pathology.On the contrary, theymay, under some con-
ditions, reflect due confidence and intellectual perspicacity of a high order.
For of course, one could hardly maintain generally—in regard to ideas any
more than to other human products or practices—that the new will always
emerge as better; the questioned, as vulnerable; the traditional, as properly
superseded.
In any case, no less interesting for a general account of intellectual dy-
namics are the responses of scholars, scientists, and theorists less firmly
wedded to the orthodoxy under siege but perplexed in other ways: those, for
example, who are unsettled by the current challenges or at least notice that
the traditional justifications and refutations are no longer adequate or con-
clusive for significant portions of the relevant communities, but who, for
often complex reasons, are nevertheless not prepared to pursue explicitly—
much less endorse wholeheartedly—the controversial new alternatives.
Among this latter group are scholars who, by reason of personal history
or current commitments, are especially anxious about the unhappy ethical
or political consequences said to be entailed by those alternatives (quiet-
ism, complicity, anything-goes-ism, and so forth) or who, as members of
a perennially intellectually suspect group (for example, blacks or women),
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are especially anxious about their own intellectual standing among profes-
sional associates. The result in such cases may be, and often is, a compul-
sive generation of equivocal positions—positions that signal simultaneously
or in swift oscillation both an appreciation of and a distancing from cur-
rently heterodox ideas. Equivocation under such circumstances may be re-
quired for minimal cognitive well-being and immediate professional self-
preservation. Since, however, the hybrid positions so generated tend to be
conceptually unstable, requiring continuous shoring up and other repair,
they are also intellectually costly. Moreover, because prevailing views in a
field are always ultimately responsive to broader intellectual developments,
the continuous reaffirmation of conventionally accepted ideas, even if only
in equivocal terms, risks not only intellectual confinement but professional
immobility as well. In other words, ostensibly prudent equivocationmay be,
in the long run, professionally as well as intellectually self-disabling.
When radical alternatives to orthodox views are being proposed, it can
be strategically useful, though in different ways, for proponents of either
side—that is, traditionalists and revisionists—to cast their own positions as
amiddle way between extremes. For the traditionalist it permits a display of
genial sophistication and avoids the stigma of sheer stuffiness. For revision-
ists the claim of middle-way moderation may dampen automatic alarm sig-
nals and retain the attention of audiences who might otherwise just balk or
bolt. Thus a novel and ultimately radical set of ideas may sweeten its debut
statement and disarm criticism along certain predictable lines by declaring
itself a middle way between the orthodoxy that it does indeed reject (for ex-
ample, classical realism or normative epistemology) and the heresy, real or
phantom, with which it can expect to be identified (for example, classical
idealism or everything-is-equally-good relativism).37
Not all audiences, however, will find the middle-way steering either ap-
pealing or admirable. The risk for the equivocating traditionalist is that his
or her genial sophistication will be seen by more stalwart colleagues as con-
tamination by—or outright capitulation to—mere intellectual fashion.Con-
versely, themoderatingmaneuvers of the prudent revisionist are likely to be
regarded bymore explicitly radical colleagues as granting toomuch to estab-
lished views or as simply regressive. There are, moreover, other—perhaps
less visible or audible—members of the intellectual community who will
also be impatient with these cautiously equivocated articulations. Especially
significant are younger practitioners in the fields in question, for whom the
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most eagerly sought reports of new methods or models will be those that
stress, isolate, and elaborate their most innovative elements and, thereby,
make themmost readily accessible for exploration in connection with those
practitioners’ own, perhaps comparably innovative, projects. To put this in
broader terms: the versions of new intellectual developments that indicate
most clearly and powerfully their most heterodox elements and challenging
implications are also, for that very reason, most likely to energize investi-
gation, extension, and refinement—and, by the same token, to reveal most
readily their conceptual and practical limits or inadequacies.
In relation to such broader perspectives, a number of the moves and
strategies discussed above, including devil-blackening, political flag-waving,
and tendentious mischaracterization, could be seen as not merely individu-
ally but communally—socially and institutionally—costly as well. Rhetori-
cal strategies are not, inmy view, contemptible as such, or necessarily other-
wise objectionable. On the contrary, I cannot imagine what a nonstrategic
argument or nonrhetorical exposition would be. Nor do I think conceptual
moves can or should be ‘‘free,’’ as it is said, of institutional, professional,
or even social pressures. Indeed, I would say that a susceptibility to being
shaped by such pressures is inseparable from the virtue of intellectual re-
sponsiveness or, perhaps, just another way of stating that virtue. I do not,
then, set conceptual moves and rhetorical strategies in opposition to right
thinking and straight talking. Nevertheless, I do think the intellectual life of
a community can become limited, maimed, and stultified when easy points
are scored by appeals to ignorance; when concepts, positions, individual
figures, and entire disciplines are—without having been intellectually en-
gaged—casually maligned or swaggeringly derided; and when political or
moral pieties are used in cloak-and-dagger operations against intellectual
or institutional rivals.
Finally, as I hope is clear, I am not calling here for an across-the-board
show of intellectual heroism. Different situations require different assess-
ments of personal, professional, and social risk, and of course, some vul-
nerabilities are more visible than others. My broader purpose here has not
been to indict individual scholars or theorists for trimming or timidity but,
rather, to highlight some of the conceptual and rhetorical practices that both
reveal and perpetuate the risks of intellectual radicalism in our own time
and to suggest some of the costs we all pay as a result.
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